# Latent Fault Detection With Unbalanced Workloads

#### Moshe Gabel


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Submitted to EPForDM 2015






Background

### LATENT FAULT DETECTION





#### The Problem With Predefined Rules







#### Flexible Latent Fault Detection

- Find *latent faults*: machines with problems "under the radar".
- ► Latent faults precede > 20% of failures days in advance.
- Outlier detection on performance counter logs.

#### **GOOD – EASY, FLEXIBLE, PRACTICAL:**

- ▶ Predict failures up to 14 days in advance with high precision.
- ► No tuning, specialized knowledge, or labeled examples.

#### **PROBLEMS – CENTRALIZATION, LOAD BALANCING:**


- ► Large data: communicating and processing machine metrics.
- Only for load-balanced services.





#### **TASK: Find Outliers**

- ightharpoonup Given M multivariate time series of C measurements...
- ► Machines in scale-out, load balance service.



- ► Task: find outliers series with "bad" behavior.
  - ► Example: machine with HW/SW error






#### **IDEA: Wisdom of the Crowds**

Exploit suitable **homogeneity** assumptions:

Similar processes (machines) will exhibit similar behavior.








#### **Outliers Are Different**

► Outliers come from different processes – break homogeneity:

Outliers (faulty machines) are consistently different.







## Sign Test: Is Machine i an Outlier?

- ightharpoonup At each time: average direction from t s vector to others.
- ightharpoonup Add the average directions across T times; compare lengths.
- ► Compute probability  $p \downarrow i = \Pr[\text{ series } i \text{ not outlier }].$ 
  - ► Via concentration bounds or something else.
- $ightharpoonup p \downarrow i$  too low ightharpoonup series i is an outlier.



Workload	Centralized	Distributed
Balanced		
Unbalanced	<b>√</b>	

Submitted to EPForDM 2015

With Kento Sato @ LLNL, Satoshi Matsuoka @ TITECH

# LATENT FAULT DETECTION WITH UNBALANCED WORKLOADS





## Detect Latent Faults In More Settings

Go beyond load-balanced, scale out web services:

- Unbalanced cloud workloads
  - Statically-balanced key-value stores
- Parallel computation clusters
  - Hadoop
- Supercomputers
  - ► TSUBAME2





## **Central Assumptions**

- ► Homogenous machines
  - Common for logistical reasons



- ► Majority of machines are OK
  - ▶ Otherwise systems don't work



- Dynamic load balancing
  - ► Hadoop and similar have unbalanced workloads

Y. Kwon, K. Ren, M. Balazinska, and B. Howe. Managing skew in Hadoop. IEEE Data Eng. Bull., 2013.



Supercomputers: uneven work distribution





#### **Assume Intrinsic Correlations**

- ► Inherent dependencies exists between counter values.
  - (not necessarily linear, pairwise)
- Characterize running job same regardless of load.
- Example: for each client request we need:
  - ▶ 10MB of memory, 3 DB transactions, 2% CPU

Requests	Memory	DB	CPU
3	630	9	6
5	650	15	10
4	640	12	8






#### **Faults Break Correlations**

- Established rule:  $1/10 \text{ memory}+1/3 DB-1/2 CPU-requests}-60=0$
- ▶ Problems cause deviation from established relationships.
  - ▶ DB errors, memory leaks, high CPU usage...


Requests	Memory	DB	CPU
3	630	9	6
5	650	15	10
4	640	12	8
3	740	9	15
8	680	24	16







## **CPU Usage vs Requests**







## **New Strategy**

- New assumption: similar machines doing same work → similar correlations.
- Establish linear correlations at each point in time.
- ► Machine consistently breaks correlations? → latent fault.
- Limit false positives via statistics.
  - J. E. Jackson and G. S. Mudholkar. Control procedures for residuals associated with principal component analysis. Technometrics, 1979.
  - H. Xu, C. Caramanis, and S. Mannor. Outlier-robust PCA: The high-dimensional case. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013.
  - M. Gabel, A. Schuster, R.-G. Bachrach, and N. Bjorner. Latent fault detection in large scale services. In Proc. DSN, 2012







## PCA Subspace Decomposition

- Counters = normal subspace + abnormal subspace.
  - ► Top principal components capture most variance
  - Normal subspace = top principal components = healthy correlations
  - Abnormal subspace = residual subspace
- ► Learn normal subspace from majority of machines.
  - Historical data unreliable or irrelevant.
- ► Project to abnormal subspace. Large projection? → outlier
  - ► Statistical guarantees: Jackson and Mudholkar 1979, Gabel et al. 2012.
- ► HR-PCA (Xu et al. 2013) robust to outliers, corrupted data.






## **Subspace Decomposition**







## **Subspace Decomposition**








#### At Each Point of Time

► We have many machines at each point in time:







#### Variant 1 – Hard Threshold

- ightharpoonup Create  $M \times C$  matrix and apply PCA.
  - Standardize data to zero mean, unit variance.
- Normal subspace:  $H \downarrow no = [v \downarrow 1, v \downarrow 2, ..., v \downarrow k]$ 
  - First *k* principal components that capture 95% of variance.
- ► Abnormal subspace:  $H \downarrow ab = (I H \downarrow no H \downarrow no \uparrow T)$
- Project machine data to abnormal subspace:  $Q \downarrow m = ||H \downarrow ab \ x \downarrow m||1$
- ▶ If  $Q \downarrow m > Q \downarrow \alpha$  consistently, machine is suspect.
  - ▶ Threshold  $Q \downarrow \alpha$  from Jackson and Mudholkar 1979.





## Dealing With Many Machines

- $\triangleright Q \downarrow \alpha$  guarantees false positive rate  $\alpha$  for testing one machine.
  - ▶ We must test *M* machines!
- ► Raise alarm only if  $Q \downarrow m > Q \downarrow \alpha$  for T' consecutive times.
- ► False alarm probability decreases **exponentially** in *T*′.
  - ▶ False alarm in specific machine m in  $T^{\uparrow}$  consecutive times:  $\alpha \uparrow T^{\uparrow}$
  - ► False alarm in at least one machine after T1' times:  $1-(1-\alpha \uparrow T1)$  ' )↑M
- ightharpoonup Window T that guarantees final false alarm probability p:

$$TT' = \lceil \log \lambda \alpha \left( 1 - \sqrt{M \& 1 - p} \right) \rceil$$





#### Variant 2 – Latent Fault Framework

- ► Hard threshold too strict: high  $Q \downarrow \alpha$  in noisy data.
  - ▶  $Q \downarrow m < Q \downarrow \alpha$  even for faulty machines → missed faults.
- Statistical framework from Gabel et al. 2012:  $S(m,x(t))=Q\downarrow m /||x\downarrow m||12 = ||H\downarrow ab x\downarrow m||12 /||x\downarrow m||12$
- Integrate for each machine:  $v \downarrow m = 1/T \sum t \uparrow MS(m,x(t))$
- ► Get p-value:  $p(m)=(M+1)\exp(-2TM\gamma \uparrow 2/(\sqrt{M}+1) \uparrow 2)$





## Probability Bound Tightness with M

Old Framework: probability linearly weaker with more machines:

$$p(m) = (M+1)\exp(-T2\gamma t^2 M/(\sqrt{M}+1)t^2)$$

higher M weakens bound

higher

weaken bound for low M

tightens bound

Had to increase window size T to compensate for high M.

New bound: false alarm probability drops **exponentially** in M:  $p=1-(1-\alpha \uparrow T \uparrow')\uparrow M$ 






## Very Small Window T'

ightharpoonup TT' logarithmic in M.

Examples for  $\alpha$ =0.01, false alarm p < 0.01.




- ► M=10000 machines  $\rightarrow$  need window size of just 3:  $T1' = \lceil \log 10.01 \ (1 \sqrt{10000 \& 1 0.01}) \rceil = \lceil 2.99891... \rceil = 3$
- For **one million** machines, need **window size = 4**:  $T = [\log \downarrow 0.01 \ (1 \sqrt{1000000} \& 1 0.01)] = [3.99891...] = 4$





#### **Unbalanced Workloads**

Healthy machines have same correlations.



Normal data lies in normal subspace!

► PCA recomputed each time → robust to changes in system!





## Preliminary Results on Supercomputer


- ► TSUBAME2 logs of one month of "jobs"
  - ► No scheduling info.
  - ► CPU and GPU load used to infer grouping.
  - ► At least 10 machines per job, at least 240 minutes.
- ▶ 45 common metrics, collected every 1-10 minutes.
- Compare to historical failure logs 7 day horizon.
  - ► Failure probability per day: roughly 0.2%







## Original Latent Fault Detector

Complete failure: no better than random guess.












# PCA (Variant 2, "soft threshold")

- Significant improvement!
- Hard threshold variant too conservative.
  - Issued no alerts.
- ► Not yet practical.
  - $\triangleright$  Low FPR  $\rightarrow$  low TPR.
- Ad-hoc grouping problematic.
  - excludes failing machines, includes unrelated machines.







#### **Future Work**

- ▶ Test on additional data:
  - Mobile network data.
  - ► Key-value stores.
  - Hadoop logs.
- ► Sparse PCA.
- Infer jobs with subspace clustering.

- ► Communication-efficient version.
  - Distributed variance monitor to normalize data.
  - ► New class of PCA sketches.
  - Geometric monitoring based on convex decompositions.
- E. Liberty. Simple and deterministic matrix sketching. In Proc. KDD, 2013.
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- M. Ghashami and J. M. Phillips. Relative errors for deterministic low-rank matrix approximations. In Proc. SODA. 2014.
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